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Payment by results may meet the same failures Ministers hoped to overcome. Dan
Finn suggests that lessons from similar schemes around the world show the risks to
service delivery and the need for stronger safeguards for participants.
The National Audit Office (NAO) has identified heightened risks to the viability of
Government’s flagship ‘payment by results’ Work Programme (WP). The NAO has
questioned the accuracy of the projections on which DWP based performance
expectations that underpin the funding of the programme; the investment decisions and
income of 18 largely for-profit prime providers and their subcontractors; and the services to be
received by the 3.3 million people expected to pass through the programme over five years.
Increased unemployment and greater competition for jobs are not the only risks associated with
contracts and with paying providers largely on the basis of long term job outcomes. In a review
commissioned by the NAO I explored how such risks have emerged and been managed internationally.
The WP has unique features but variants of such contracts are now found in a wide range of countries
with most evidence from Australia, the USA and the Netherlands.
The positive results highlighted in some assessments suggest that private and third sector contractors
have brought innovation and new capacity to service delivery and that competition and payment for
performance has generated efficiencies and cost savings. Critics dispute the idea that the conditions
for effective competition exist. The transaction costs of designing, awarding, and subsequently
managing contracts are high, and the difficulties of managing complex services through performance
based contracts have posed risks to service access, costs, quality and accountability.
Closer scrutiny of the ‘welfare markets’ in the other countries raise other concerns. Evidence on the
quality and variability of the services delivered is mixed. More positive assessments highlight the
enhanced capacity of frontline case managers when they tailor support to individuals and broker job
placements with employers. More critical evaluations suggest that providers ‘crowd around’ less costly
job search assistance and ‘cream’ and ‘park’ participants. In Australia, for example, the first contracts
relied on provider behaviour being driven through differential payments and outcome incentives. The
efficiencies gained in the first years were, however, undermined by the emergence of large scale
‘parking’, with providers ‘cherry picking’ the most employable participants to invest in. Subsequently,
the Australian Government had to introduce greater specification of service requirements and ‘ring
fence’ funding to ensure a minimum spend on participants.
Service user journeys across mixed public and private provision can be complicated, especially for the
most disadvantaged. In Australia, the Netherlands and the US problems have arisen with ‘failures to
attend’, incorrect assessments, and the imposition of sanctions. Other problems may arise from poor
interactions between health assessments and job search and programme activity requirements. Such
risks may be heightened with the WP because of its duration, subcontractor delivery chains, and the
requirement for participants to maintain regular contact with a private provider whilst continuing to ‘sign
on’. Service users will need clear and timely information to avoid ‘mixed messages’ and it will be
important to monitor trends in sanctions and the interactions on conditionality between Jobcentre Plus
(JCP) and WP providers.
WP prime contractors have specified the varied minimum services they intend to provide and are
obliged to inform service users about the services they will make available. There are, however, few
safeguards to ensure the delivery of services and DWP will have only limited insight into the ‘black box’
of front line delivery. It is important to ensure that robust systems are in place to respond to complaints
of unfair treatment and poor service delivery but the WP approach seems overly complex, with prime
contractors having freedom in how they communicate their disputes and resolution procedures to
participants and no obvious mechanism for collating complaints information between JCP, prime
contractors and DWP. It is important also for DWP to augment current safeguards with methods, such
as surveys, that generate greater insight into the experience of participants most of whom will be
compelled to participate.
Concerns have been expressed also about the role of third sector organisations and WP prime
providers’ management of their subcontractors and the contractual terms and risks they have passed
on to smaller organisations. The evidence from the other countries suggest a mixed future with the
growth of non-profits that deliver performance or provide valued niche services, alongside a reduction
in the number of such organisations involved. In New York City, for example, the introduction of a prime
contracting model from 2000 was associated with a ‘shake out’ of community based and smaller non-
profits. For some the loss of these ‘less effective’ providers increased efficiency, thereby improving
services for participants. Others have argued that participants with special needs may be less well
served and that while the loss of many of these local organisations ‘might not show up on a balance
sheet’ it undermines the already limited social capital of poor communities.
Each of the three countries has also seen debate about the role of large scale private providers who
have emerged as a powerful interest group. In the USA in particular there has been controversy about
their operation in certain states (similar criticisms have been made of some of the larger British
providers). The US critics cite examples of corporate malpractice, including inadequate and poor
provision of services, misappropriation of funds and other financial irregularities.  In some US states
the organisations involved lost contracts; in others they have taken remedial action and continue to
deliver services. Large providers delivering the WP point to the small number of such cases and
suggest they are marginal relative to their success in delivering many other contracts and the strength
of the organisational, financial and management capacities they bring to the market.
Another particular risk concerns potential for market failure, where providers either go out of business
or seek to withdraw from unprofitable contracts and government has no choice but to intervene and
either ‘bail out’ a failing provider or quickly find an alternative to continue the delivery of services. The
NAO report contains a helpful figure showing potential changes to provider profit that highlight these
scenarios (shown below). The earlier ‘Pathways to Work’ contracts, which induced providers to ‘bid low
and promise high’, were undermined both by poor design, the impact of the recession, and the speed
with which previous Labour Ministers sought implementation, and despite poor performance DWP had
to change funding rules to ensure their viability. The NAO suggests there is a danger that the speed of
WP implementation and over-optimistic assumptions about labour market performance may reproduce
such problems.
Source: NAO (2012) The introduction of the Work Programme (p. 28)
Employment will recover following the return of economic growth but it will be some time before
employers start to recruit again in large numbers and many local labour markets face recruitment
freezes and redundancies in the public sector. In this context WP providers may struggle to place their
service users into sustained employment and to maintain investment in the new service delivery
systems and there is a risk that, for the unemployed, the WP may have more in common with the earlier
‘failed programmes’ that current Ministers seek to contrast it with.
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